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“Like Darwin after him, Hume has a powerful way of demythologizing the idea that humans have some 
magical capacity that distances them as a species from the rest of creation.”1 
 
Introduction 
The concept of intrinsic value, roughly that a thing has value for its own sake, has traditionally 
and controversially2 been central in environmental ethics. It is often held that a satisfactory 
environmental ethic rests on whether a defensible concept of intrinsic value can be articulated to 
ground human obligations toward elements of non-human nature as well as to nature as a whole.3 
According to J. Baird Callicott, whether or not nature has intrinsic value is “the defining 
problem for environmental ethics.”4 For if there is no intrinsic value attached to nature and the 
value of nature consists only in its instrumental value to human beings, then environmental 
ethics itself is not a distinct domain or discipline. Instead environmental ethics is a species 
of applied ethics, just another particular “application of human-to-human ethics” like that of 
bioethics or business ethics.5  
Callicott’s account of intrinsic value draws from David Hume and Charles Darwin in an 
effort to develop Aldo Leopold’s holistic ‘land ethic.’ Leopold’s land ethic “implies respect for 
fellow-members” and for the ‘biotic community’ that includes soils, waters, plants, and animals.6 
Leopold extends moral consideration not only to individual members of the natural world, but 
also to ecosystems as wholes.7 Callicott argues that Leopold’s land ethic has “philosophical 
foundations” and a “pedigree” in the history of Western moral philosophy.8 In a series of 
influential works, Callicott elaborates a “Humean/Darwinian bio-empathetic moral metaphysic” 
that is grounded in moral sentiments that are naturally selected.9 The upshot is that there is no 
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objective intrinsic value in the world; rather, value is grounded in the subjective feelings of 
observers that are then “projected” onto the relevant “natural objects or events” in the world.10 
That is, we project value not only onto fellow humans, but also onto non-human animals as well 
as the ecological system as a whole. Callicott argues that this type of subjectivism will not be 
radically relativistic because humans’ common evolutionary heritage will ensure that differences 
in valuing will be limited. 
Callicott’s view has been subject to many criticisms. A number of commentators have 
argued that Callicott’s Humean/Darwinian metaethic fails to support his first-order claims 
favoring environmental preservation.11 Many critics have also claimed that there is little basis in 
Hume’s work for this interpretation.12 We claim that although Callicott’s account does need 
supplementation, it is nevertheless on the right track. This paper develops a Humean metaethic to 
apply to the animal world and, given some further considerations, to the rest of nature. Our 
interpretation extends Hume’s account of sympathy, our natural ability to sympathize with the 
emotions of others, so that we may sympathize with not only human beings but also animals, 
plants and ecosystems as well. Further, we suggest that Hume has the resources for an account of 
environmental value that applies to non-human animals, non-sentient elements of nature as well 
as nature as whole even without the appeal to sympathy. One consequence of this approach is 
that the reasons for promoting animal welfare need not be restricted to ‘sentientist’ reasons.  
Callicott focuses primarily on giving a Humean metaethic for a holistic environmental 
ethic. Our own route proceeds first through animal ethics, which is an obvious candidate for a 
Humean view since it is not hard to see that humans may have sympathy for sentient animals. 
After doing so, we give considerations that extend this Humean animal metaethic to the rest of 
nature. It is perhaps unsurprising that Callicott fails to take this route in developing his Humean 
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account. In his early work, Callicott argues explicitly against individualistic animal ethics since it 
conflicts with holistic environmental ethics.13 For instance, a concern for ecosystemic flourishing 
is fully consistent with (and in many cases requires) gruesome killings of predators by prey. 
Thus, in line with Callicott’s early position, one who is overly sympathetic with the wellbeing of 
individual animals may be unable to properly respect the ecosystem as a whole. Even though in 
later work Callicott argues for common ground between environmentalists and animal rights 
activists, he remains skeptical of the fundamentality of claims that we should respect individual 
animals.14 But his first-order communitarian commitments make Callicott’s development of a 
Humean metaethic more difficult than it need be. By beginning with animal ethics, our 
development of a Humean environmental metaethic takes an easier route.15  
Callicott’s Humean/Darwinian Account 
Callicott’s main idea is that a Humean-Darwinian account of human feelings of benevolence can 
explain how we can feel sympathy for both individuals within nature as well as the whole of 
nature. The starting point is Darwin’s account of the origin and evolution of ethics in the 1871 
work Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. Darwin thought that social instincts lead 
an “animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy 
with them” and to help them out.16 Ethics first arises to promote the solidarity of human 
societies, upon which depends the human survival and reproductive success of the individual 
members of society. As Darwin says, “No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, 
treachery, etc., were common” and the disintegration of the tribe means that the survival and 
reproductive success of its members would be doomed.17 As such, “actions are regarded by 
savages […] as good or bad” only insofar as they “affect the welfare of the tribe - not that of the 
species, nor that of an individual member of the tribe.”18  Darwin thinks that this conclusion 
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backs up the belief that ethics is “derived from the social instincts, for both relate at first 
exclusively to the community.”19  
Callicott then traces Darwin’s view back to Hume’s theory of the moral sentiments in 
which “there also runs a strong strain of holism.”20 On Hume’s view we have “sympathy for our 
fellows” and we are also “naturally endowed with a sentiment the object of which is society 
itself.”21 In support of his interpretation, Callicott quotes a passage from the 1751 Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals22 when Hume insists that “we must renounce the theory 
which accounts for every moral sentiment by the principle of self-love” and that, we “must adopt 
a more publick affection, and allow that the interests of society are not […] entirely indifferent to 
us” (EPM 5.2.17).23 Callicott interprets this to mean that we ought to have concern for the well-
being of society as a whole as well as concern for the individual members of society. Callicott 
also emphasizes passages in which Hume says things such as the “benevolent principles of our 
frame engage us on the side of the social virtues” and that “Everything that promotes the 
interests of society must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneasiness.”24 Both 
Hume and Darwin, he points out, recognized that some moral sentiments, such as loyalty and 
patriotism, relate exclusively and specifically to society.25  
The Humean/Darwinian framework provides a subjectivist sort of intrinsic value that 
ultimately depends upon human valuers and their feelings or sentiments.26 Callicott claims that, 
“There can be no value apart from an evaluator [...] all value is as it were in the eye of the 
beholder [and] therefore, is humanly dependent.”27 He says that terms such as good, evil, beauty, 
ugliness, right, and wrong would cease to apply if all human consciousness happened to be 
“annihilated at a stroke.”28 That is to say that all intrinsic value is “anthropogenic,” that is, 
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generated by humans and “humanly conferred” although it is “not necessarily homocentric” as 
value extends beyond human beings.29 
Callicott recognizes the concern that an account of intrinsic value grounded in human 
sentiments may lead to relativism. Certainly, not everyone values old-growth forests. Some see 
no value in an old-growth forest except for its lumber value – one might say that they miss the 
forest not for the trees, per se, but for the board-feet of timber. However, if value is based upon 
human reactive attitudes, then are there interpersonal grounds upon which one claims that it is 
wrong to exploit a forest for its maximum timber value and destroy an ecosystem in so doing? 
Callicott responds to this kind of criticism by claiming that differences in attributions of intrinsic 
value are due to differences in individuals’ factual understanding of ecological processes. 
Callicott discusses at length how reading Leopold’s Sand County Almanac gave him a greater 
understanding of mountain ecology and changed his attitude toward wolf hunting. Wolves kill 
deer, and when deer population increases, flora becomes severely depleted. After seeing these 
effects, Leopold decided that it is wrong to hunt wolves. This kind of conversion is important for 
Callicott’s purposes, because it shows that making the wrong judgments about how to treat the 
non-human world can be reduced (at least in this case) to committing an error in factual 
judgment about the consequences of one’s action. Hence, there is still a genuinely normative 
aspect to his theory.30  
It is plausible to suppose (and A Sand County Almanac provides a good case-study) that 
those who have studied the complexity of biotic systems are likely to have an appreciation and 
respect for them. Just as learning more about the lives of people in distant places often has the 
effect of making one more respectful of them, learning more about complex ecological 
relationships will make one more inclined to view biotic systems as being morally considerable. 
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If this is correct, then those who believe that biotic communities have no value have either false 
beliefs or an inadequate understanding of how the biological world, of which they are a part, 
works, and this is why Callicott’s account can be taken to be genuinely normative. Moreover, 
Callicott believes that Leopold provides reasons why non-human species, biotic communities, 
and ecosystems should be valued intrinsically. Of wildflowers and songbirds, Leopold writes that 
“these creatures are members of the biotic community, and if (as I believe) its stability depends 
on its integrity, they are entitled to continuance.”31 
 Callicott’s view requires considerable convergence of human judgment under 
circumstances of good understanding of natural ecological processes, and this might be overly 
optimistic. If appreciation for nature is a natural feature of all humans, then why has there been 
such enormous variation between different people in different places, or different epochs, 
concerning their valuing of nature? To respond, Callicott invokes a Darwinian moral 
psychology.32 The basic idea is that individuals in the far past who destroyed their natural 
environments would have been unable to pass their genes down through the generations, and so 
those who have the greatest reproductive fitness are those who did not destroy their 
environments. And so somehow, it is encoded into our genes for us to wish to promote the 
flourishing of the environment. 
The majority of the criticism directed at Callicott’s environmental metaethic concerns the 
use of Hume’s theory of moral sentiments and not his Darwin’s evolutionary account, and the 
former will be our focus as well. As stated above, many commentators have claimed that Hume’s 
philosophy does not support the land ethic. Partridge even thinks that Humean moral sentiments 
actually “alienate humans from nature.”33 While we can extrapolate from sympathy with 
concrete others to consider the public interest at large, it is difficult to conceive, on Hume’s 
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view, how we can sympathize with, or take moral concern in society as a whole, over and above 
its individual members.34 Critics have also pointed out that it is difficult to see how we can 
extend moral concern to inanimate objects such as trees, soils and waters. According to Valls, 
these simply are not the sorts of things for which we can have an independent moral concern and 
so it seems difficult to incorporate such things under the Humean progress of sentiments.35 
Despite all these concerns regarding Callicott’s assumptions, the Humean environmental 
ethic approach is promising. The next section develops a Humean metaethic for the specific case 
of animal ethics. To situate our position, we survey first Hume on animals and the relevant 
interpretive options.  
Hume on Animal Morality 
Hume makes frequent comparisons between human and animal nature. Sometimes he 
emphasizes the similarity between them. He says that animals are “endowed with thought and 
reason as well as men,” that the mechanism of sympathy “takes place among animals, no less 
than among men,” and that animals are capable of the same passions of love, hatred, fear, anger, 
courage, grief, envy, malice, and pity as humans (THN 1.3.16; 2.2.12/EMPL 592). At other 
times Hume emphasizes the differences between humans and animals.36 Animals have no moral 
sense or the capacity to make moral judgments. In the Treatise he says that “incest in the human 
species is criminal” but that the same actions in animals “have not the smallest moral turpitude” 
(THN 3.1.1.25). In another notorious passage, Hume says that animals are exempt from the rules 
of justice. He imagines a species of “creatures, intermingled with men, which, though rational, 
were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all 
resistance” and claims that “we should be bound by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to 
these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice” (EPM 
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3.1.18/EMPL 467-8).37 At the end of the passage he says that this is “plainly” the situation of 
humans with regard to non-human animals (EPM 3.1.18/EMPL 467-8). This suggests that the 
rules of justice can only apply to relations between equal persons and are not applicable in the 
relations between human and purportedly inferior creatures. For Hume, then, justice does not 
apply to non-human animals. Since Hume understands the scope of justice so narrowly to 
include only property rights, then all he really means is that animals cannot own property; 
although, by the law of humanity38 animals require our mercy and compassion.39  
It seems reasonable enough to suppose that a general Humean framework provides an 
extensive conception of justice which can be applied to animals. After all, Hume thought that 
“the boundaries of justice” will continue to expand in accordance with the expansiveness of our 
viewpoints, and that history, experience and reason “sufficiently instruct us in this natural 
progress of human sentiments” (EPM 3.1.21).40 The inclusion of moral duties toward animals 
might naturally be considered as part of the “gradual enlargement” of the domain of justice 
(EPM 3.1.21). However, it might be questioned as to whether the sentiment of humanity would 
be enough to develop a genuine account of justice required for an animal ethic. Korsgaard notes 
that on Hume’s view there are no obligations towards animals although the law of humanity may 
“retrain us from treating them too badly.”41 In “Just like All the Other Animals of the Earth,” 
Korsgaard argues that while “most people seem to hold that we should not kill or hurt the 
animals unless we have a good reason, but also that any reason except malicious fun is probably 
good enough” and that “in the same way, Hume’s “laws of humanity” do not clearly forbid us to 
use the other animals in any way that we might find convenient.” In response to Korsgaard, 
Driver provides a Humean defense of humanity. Extending Hume’s “framework”, she notes that 
animals “have a kind of society with us” and “we interact with pets and other domesticated 
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animals.”42 This relationship sets up a “separate class of artificial norms” that governs the 
interactions between humans and animals.43 On the Humean view then, we may extend our 
positive duty to aid those who are suffering to include animal suffering, but this duty is confined 
only to those animals closely connected to us. There is no positive duty to aid animals that do not 
have a connection with us such as wild animals although we do at least have a negative duty not 
to cause animal suffering.44  
On Hume’s account, moral sentiments for others are based in sympathy. Sympathy is a 
natural mechanism in human nature by which we “receive by communication” the “inclinations 
and sentiments” of others resembling us so that one’s idea of another’s emotion, say my idea of 
your happiness, when vivid enough, is actually converted into the experience of the emotion 
itself  (THN 2.1.11.2, 4-8). Hume recognizes that it is natural for us to sympathize more greatly 
with those closest to us, meaning that it is easier to relate to and connect with someone who is 
similar and close to you. Our ability to sympathize thus varies with the differences in the 
relations between our self and to others: our spatial and temporal distance to other persons, the 
degree of resemblance others have to us, and whether relations of causality exist between our self 
and others, such as our being related as family members or as close friends. Recent research has 
supported the notion that it is also much easier to sympathize with someone you recognize, 
understand and identify with.45 
To compensate for variation in the observer’s sympathies resulting from physical or 
temporal closeness to or distance from the person judged, Hume recommends contemplation of 
the person or action from a common perspective or general point of view (EPM 9.1.6). These 
sorts of corrections are “common” to all of our senses (THN 3.3.1.16). If we did not correct our 
own perspective and assume some sort of common standard in our everyday interactions with 
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others, communication would be difficult and we would run into constant conflicts with others 
(THN 3.3.1.16). So we consider a general point of view in which the character or action of the 
person is examined from the standpoint where it appears the same to every person “without 
reference to our particular interest” (THN 3.1.2.4; 3.3.1.30). As Elizabeth Radcliffe explains, if 
we understand that “our sentiments are influenced by our particular perspectives” we can 
“compensate for our relation to others by considering how we would feel when the influence of 
relations eliminated.”46 It is only when “we fix on some steady and general point of view” that in 
fact moral sentiments are felt (THN 3.3.1.15-16). The consideration of person or action in 
general is what “causes such a feeling or sentiment as denominates it morally good or evil,” or 
produces “that particular feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend” (THN 
3.1.2.4; 3.3.130). Sympathy allows us to continue to feel pleasure or displeasure from the 
consideration of the characters of persons or actions considered from the general point of view. 
We must take up the general point of view for the sympathetic pleasant or unpleasant feelings to 
cause a corresponding pleasant or unpleasant moral sentiment that marks the presence of virtue 
or vice.47  
As previously noted Hume thought that the strength of the sympathetic communication of 
sentiments is subject to variation and depends upon the degree of resemblance as well as the 
distance between the observer and the person with whom he or she sympathizes. Hume does 
emphasize the resemblances between humans and animals: both experience pain and pleasure, 
possess reason48 and the passions, and are capable of sympathy.49 Given this, along with the fact 
that because of sympathy we infer the feelings of others by their behaviors and the fact that 
animals express their feelings in ways similar to those of humans, we can sympathize with 
animals when they experience pain or pleasure. Increased understanding of our similarity to 
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animals will heighten our feelings of sympathy towards animals. Studies indicate that our 
sympathy for different species tends to increase with phylogenetic relatedness to humans.50  
Even though Hume acknowledges that we do sympathize to a greater degree with those 
close to us than we do with those that are further removed, the fact remains that we can and do 
sympathize with those that are further removed from us, including animals. According to Hume, 
this is done by taking up the general point of view. When we adopt the general point of view and 
from that position contemplate the quality or character of another which has a tendency to 
produce good for others or humanity itself or non-human animals, and whose operation 
produces, or is expected to produce, pleasure, we approve of it, as we sympathize with the 
feelings of those affected.  
Further, given that humans and animals both strive to avoid pain, we feel disapprobation 
towards those who are malicious, i.e., those who inflict or condone the infliction of pain and 
suffering on both humans and animals, we deem their motives and character to be vicious, and 
consider them morally blameworthy. From a Humean point of view then, it is morally wrong to 
inflict pain and suffering on any animal whether close to us or far away, domestic or wild. The 
only relevant differences between our relationships with domesticated and wild or distant 
animals are those of degree of distance, resemblance and causality, and thus we can still 
sympathize with animals that are exploited far away from us and deem poor treatment of them to 
be immoral. In sum, if we allow that our sympathy extends to animals, and if we are capable of 
taking up the general point of view, then we can be moved by the plights of animals suffering 
whether those animals are domesticated or wild, or close to us or far away from us. Since this 
concern can be seen as an intrinsic valuing of these animals, this view provides the groundwork 
for humans to have positive duties to relieve such cases of animal suffering, like a duty to do 
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something about some of the unnecessary suffering of rabbits used in experiments in human 
cosmetics. We might broaden the scope of sympathy and our resulting moral emotions are what 
ultimately move us to act compassionately towards animals on the Humean view. 
One problem for a Humean account of value in animals ethics is that it is questionable 
exactly which sentiments play the proper role in determining one’s moral judgment. Many 
natural processes are distasteful to many humans in many ways, and many humans take delight 
in many natural processes.52 But this problem may also be overcome by appealing to the general 
point of view. Hume thinks sympathy also “has a great influence on our sense of beauty” and 
recommends we “fix on some steady and general points of view” to correct our judgments about 
beauty. While we may not immediately delight at the appearance of certain sorts of creatures, it 
is certainly possible that a greater understanding of how the animal’s unique physical features 
help it to survive and its integral role in the system of nature might alter our judgment about their 
appearance. 
Concerns have been raised that Callicott’s Humean environmental ethic may not provide 
the kind of convergence needed for a proper environmental ethic. But in the case of animal 
metaethics, if the foregoing is correct, such concerns are lessened. Of course, not every person 
values non-human animals. The degree of variation, given the right kinds of information about 
non-human animals, is not as extensive as the difference in how much different people value 
non-sentient aspects of nature. There is considerable convergence among people that non-human 
animals matter. For instance, a prominent study of American attitudes shows widespread 
agreement that non-human animals matter.53 In the next section, we consider whether a Humean 
account can extend sympathy so as to embrace not only other human beings and animals, but 
also non-sentient things like plants and ecosystems as well, and we suggest that a Humean 
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account of value may even extend to non-human animals, the non-sentient parts of nature and 
ecosystems without sympathy. 
A Humean Environmental Ethic? 
We have focused primarily on providing a Humean metaethic which shows that non-human 
animals are, in principle at least, morally considerable. However, there are other resources in 
Hume’s sentimentalism – resources to which Callicott and others do not appeal – which support 
an extension of moral consideration to other aspects of the non-human world. 
As Valls has shown, several of Callicott’s critics have pointed out that aesthetic 
considerations are morally relevant from a Humean point of view.54 If we do value and 
appreciate these aesthetic aspects of nature, they may provide “reasons and motives for 
preserving it.”55 Hume allows that we are affected with pleasure by inanimate objects in the 
world such as houses, ships and chimneys (THN 2.2.5.16). He pays special attention to features 
of the natural world that “delight us” such as rich soils and a “happy climate” (THN 3.3.1.20).  
Sunshine or “well-cultivated plains” communicate to us a “secret joy and satisfaction” (EPM 
6.1.22). Grand features in the natural world such as a vast ocean, an “extended plain,” a “wide 
forest” or “a vast chain of mountains” do “excite in the mind a sensible emotion” and this 
“admiration […] is one of the most lively pleasures, which human nature is capable of enjoying” 
(THN 2.2.8.4). The advantages attached to natural objects increases our admiration. He says 
“that nothing renders a field more agreeable than its fertility” and that a “plain, overgrown with 
furze and broom, may be, in itself, as beautiful as a hill cover’d with vines or olive-trees” (THN 
2.2.5.18/3.3.1.8). 
This is all made possible by sympathy. Hume gives the example of a person who shows 
us with particular care the layout of a convenient house. The beauty is evident in the house and 
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this gives us pleasure but also by the communication of sentiments we also sympathize with the 
proprietor of the house: we “enter into his interest” and “feel the same satisfaction, that the 
objects naturally occasion in him” (THN 2.2.5.16). Hume extends this observation to objects 
such as tables, chairs, coaches, saddles, and ploughs. The beauty of these kinds of objects is 
“chiefly derived from their utility” and this advantage concerns the owner alone and interests the 
spectator via sympathy only (THN 2.2.5.17). Features of nature such as the fertility of soils, 
bright sunshine and the vast plains “delight us by a reflection on the happiness they wou’d afford 
the inhabitants” (THN 3.3.1.20). The Humean view can allow that sentiments to preserve or 
destroy certain kinds of inanimate objects and features of nature are the sorts of things that can 
be morally considerable given their fundamental relations to humans.  
Furthermore, sentiments toward the preservation or destruction of society as a whole can 
themselves be morally considerable given that society is necessary for the subsistence of the 
human species. Human life relates to and depends on the elements of nature and the ecological 
system in fundamental and complex ways. Hume argues that we depend on society to survive 
and we want to advance it (EMPL 480/THN 3.2.2.24). Accordingly everything “that promotes 
the interests of society must communicate pleasure” and moral approval, whereas “what is 
pernicious give uneasiness” and is morally blameworthy (EPM 5.2.46). All the virtues that have 
a “tendency to the public good,” such as justice and loyalty, “derive all their merit from our 
sympathy with those, who reap any advantage from them” (THN 3.3.6.1).  
The non-human components of our environment – animals and natural features such as 
the rivers, soils, oceans, even the societal system as a whole – are then capable of engaging our 
sympathy via pleasure and becoming objects of moral standing on the Humean view. A Humean 
view might even allow, as Haught suggests, that “we are warranted in projecting some kinds of 
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intrinsic values to objects that have instrumental value or are subjectively satisfying.”56 Even if 
the origin of our interest in such objects is entirely instrumental, our interest can and in many 
cases does extend to an intrinsic valuing. This is not due to any necessary connection between 
usefulness and intrinsic goodness, but even if the intrinsic valuing does owe its origins to 
instrumental valuing, this does not comprise any sort of mistake.  
There may even be resources in Hume’s account to develop a sentimentalist account of 
moral regard to nature without extending sympathy to it. To explain we draw on Frierson’s 
compelling case that sympathy with non-sentient nature is possible within Adam Smith’s 
ethics.57 Contra Callicott who finds “little ethical holism” in Smith’s moral philosophy, Frierson 
shows the possibility of extending Smith’s account of sympathy, “and thereby benevolence and 
justice,” to nature.58 Frierson also shows how Smith can accommodate similar attitudes toward 
nature without any extension of sympathy. He appeals to Smith’s account of sympathy and 
duties toward the dead to show how “Smith provides a model for how to account for similar 
attitudes towards nature.”59 This is “important in the context of environmental ethics” according 
to Frierson because it “dramatically expands the scope of sympathy” beyond sentient creatures 
since the “dead are not human, not sentient, and not even living.”60  
There is a lot of debate about the similarities and differences between Hume and Smith 
on sympathy. Frierson explains the main difference is that Hume emphasizes “that one 
sympathizes with the actual passions of the object of one’s sympathy” whereas Smith’s “account 
of sympathy includes sufficient examples to show that sympathetic feelings are based not on the 
actual feelings of another.”61  For Smith, sympathy depends on how one feels when “one 
imagines oneself in the position of the other, and that feeling will often be quite different from 
what that other feels.”62 There is not the space to compare Hume and Smith on sympathy in 
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detail, but it is worth noting that Hume might have the resources to adopt a similar approach. If 
so, then it might also be possible on Hume’s account that one might have attitudes and duties 
towards non-human animals, parts of non-sentient nature and the ecological system as a whole 
without the requirement of sympathy. Frierson acknowledges in the twenty-fifth footnote of 
“Adam Smith and the Possibility of Sympathy with Nature” that there are some examples 
wherein “Hume seems to suggest that one can sympathize without sympathizing with actual 
feelings of another.” Hume describes, for example, being present at the “more terrible operations 
of surgery”: 
‘tis certain, that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the laying of the 
bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of anxiety and concern in 
the patient and assistants, would have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the 
strongest sentiments of pity and terror (THN 3.3.1.7). 
This example of the observer strongly resonating with the feelings of the patient during the 
preparation of instruments in anticipation for a surgical operation supports the possibility of 
extending Hume’s account of sympathy to non-human aspects of nature.  
Moreover, Hume admits that when we apply these principles of correction to our 
feelings, we find that our feelings do not often correspond entirely to our considered judgments. 
He says that the “judgment corrects or endeavours to correct the appearance, but that “it is not 
able entirely to prevail over sentiment” (EPM 5.2 n. 1). He allows thus that our passions “do not 
always follow our corrections” and that our passions “do not readily follow the determination of 
our judgment” (THN 3.3.1.21, 17).  
Nevertheless the correction of our sentiments is good enough to serve its purpose for our 
everyday social interactions with other people. Hume says that the correction is “sufficient to 
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regulate our abstract notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning 
the degrees of virtue and vice” (THN 3.3.1.21). He writes that even though,  
the heart takes not part entirely with those general notions, nor regulates all its love and 
hatred, by the universal abstract differences of vice and virtue, without regard to self, or 
the persons with whom we are more intimately connected; yet, have these moral 
differences a considerable influence, and being sufficient at least for discourse, serve all 
our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools (EPM 5.2).  
Consequently, Hume’s theory does not require that our feelings need to correspond precisely to 
the moral standards we adopt and espouse in discourse. Hume even suggests that moral 
judgments can occur without the presence of actual feelings:  
We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one performed in our 
neighbourhood the other day: The meaning of which is, that we know from reflection, 
that the former action would excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, 
were it placed in the same position (THN 3.3.1.18). 
This has the advantage of broadening the scope of a Humean environmental ethic. Now it may 
be possible to defend environmental values toward not only animals, but also inanimate objects 
such as trees and marshes, as well as the whole of nature without the sole appeal to sympathy 
with nature.  
One further point worth noting, especially in the context of the other essays in this book, 
is that this also entails that our reasons for caring for animals (and even other humans) need not 
depend exclusively on their status as fellow sentient beings. We may appreciate all animals for 
their beauty and for their contributions to the ecosystems of which they are parts.  
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One might still argue that the kind of moral standing on this Humean view is a purely 
instrumental value, and thus does not provide the kind of warrant for intrinsic moral 
consideration of the environment that is desired by Callicott and other environmental 
philosophers. There are three forms of response to this. First, we might abandon the 
intrinsic/instrumental value distinction. One could adopt a view, such as that of Bryan Norton, 
who seeks to undermine the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value, and claims that 
arguments in favor of environmental preservation should be cast in terms of anthropocentric 
reasons.63 Second, one might claim that sentiments favoring environmental preservation have 
become so entrenched within us that even in specific cases where there is no human benefit of a 
feature of the environment or even of a far-flung ecosystem as a whole, we would continue to 
value the environment and desire its preservation, all things considered. For example, it seems 
that even if the last person (as in Richard Sylvan’s famous thought experiment from “Is There a 
Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?”) derives pleasure out of destroying the last 
remaining trees, there still seem (to many people, at least) to be moral reasons why he is wrong 
to do so.  
Third, we can accept that Hume himself did not accept an extension of intrinsic ethical 
consideration to ecosystems, but we may still use the resources of the metaethical system he 
develops, with its non-relativist sentimentalist projectivism, to create a neo-Humean 
environmental metaethic, in the same spirit as Callicott’s. This might be done in a variety of 
ways. The fact is that many humans – especially those who have studied ecology – nowadays do 
have sentiments favoring ecosystems and this may be enough to ground an ascription of intrinsic 
value to the natural world. Hume did recommend that the expression and scope of such feelings 
of sympathy and moral sentiments depend on how far our reason and understanding informs 
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them, so it makes sense that the Humean environmental ethic would be open to revision of 
sentiments in light of new empirical information about the inter-relatedness of natural beings in 
ecological science. In this spirit we hope to have shown in this paper that there is no reason to 
limit Humean moral sentiments to the human species.64  
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